The purpose of the paper is to study the e¤ects of taxation on dividend payments and ex-dividend price changes in Sweden during [1991][1992][1993][1994][1995]. Under this period, dividends and capital gains were taxed at a ‡at rate. Tax changes in Sweden during the 1990s thus provide an opportunity to include direct measures of the tax treatment of dividends and capital gains in the empirical analysis, in contrast to previous studies. The results indicate that tax reforms have large e¤ects on dividend payments, while the e¤ects on ex-dividend price changes are less conclusive.
in most countries are considered part of personal-income taxation, and since tax schedules are usually progressive, private investors face di¤erent marginal tax rates. But under the 1991 Swedish tax-reform, dividends and capital gains became taxed separately from ordinary income, at a ‡at rate.
During 1991 to 1995 there were then three succesive tax regimes for domestic individual investors: initially dividends and capital gains were taxed at the same rate (30%); then one where dividends were taxed more heavily;
and …nally one where capital gains were taxed more heavily. The fact that all domestic individual investors faced the same ‡at rate, means that the marginal tax rate was exogenously given at individual as well as market level.
Dividends are often tax penalized for private investors, while institutional investors usually face identical tax rates on dividends and capital gains (Boyd and Jagganathan, 1994) . Kalay (1982 Kalay ( , 1984 argued that this could create possibilities for arbitrage by institutional investors, who would then prefer high-dividend stocks. Possibilities for arbitrage might also induce institutional owners to demand high dividend pay-outs. Tests performed on estimation results of the impact of taxation on price changes on the cumand ex-dividend day could not discriminate whether domestic individual investors or institutional investors were the marginal shareholders.
However, when dividends and capital gains are separated from other personal income and taxed at ‡at rates, as after the 1991 Swedish tax reform, then variation in the DOR cannot be explained by tax-induced clienteles among domestic individual investors. Therefore, the 1991 Swedish tax reform provides a unique opportunity for examining the tax-clientele hypoth-esis using price data from the stock market.
The results here show that the decision to pay dividends is a¤ected by having di¤erent tax rates on dividends and capital gains facing domestic individual investors. The e¤ects are substantial, and robust to changes in speci…cation. The direct impact on stock prices around the ex-dividend day is less clear. We also …nd the DOR positively related to dividend yields (statistically signi…cant at the ten-percent level). In the Swedish tax system this relation cannot be explained by tax-induced clienteles among domestic individual investors.
The next section describes previous studies on determinants of dividend pay-outs and ex-dividend price behavior. Section 3 then describes the data used here and the tax policy changes in Sweden during 1991-95. Section 4 describes the empirical models, while Section 5 presents the results. The …nal section summarizes and draws conclusions.
Previous studies 2.1 Explaining the dividend pay-out
Dividends may be used as a signaling device (Battacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985; Ambarish, John and Williams, 1987) , providing investors with information about future growth opportunities of …rms that is not available elsewhere. Another use of dividends may be as an instrument to reduce agency-costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Easterbrook, 1984) , restricting managerial discretion. In addition, a number of studies (e.g., Bradley et al., 1998; Charitou and Vafeas, 1998) have been able to predict dividends with precision using …rms' free cash- ‡ows, implying that they re ‡ect high liquidity. Firms may also be more willing to pay high dividends when market risk is relatively low. The classical model (Lintner, 1956) suggests that dividends are highly persistent over time, implying that previous dividends can explain present dividends.
As noted earlier, di¤erences in taxation might in ‡uence the size of dividends. In most countries, dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, creating a preference for low-dividend policies. But where they are treated as ordinary income subject to progressive rates both dividends and capital gains may be taxed di¤erently for di¤erent domestic individual investors, those with high marginal tax rates prefering low-dividend stocks and those with lower marginal rates prefering high-dividend stocks, thus creating tax-induced clienteles. Bell and Jenkinson (2002) o¤er a related explanation focusing on ownership, with evidence that the marginal traders on the UK stock market during 1995-1999 were pension funds. Institutional investors usually face the same tax rate on dividends and capital gains, while dividends are often tax penalized for private investors (Boyd and Jagganathan, 1994) . This can provide incentive for institutional investors to demand high dividends, in order to develop arbitrage trading strategies around the ex-dividend day (Kalay, 1982 (Kalay, , 1984 . They may also demand high dividends to force …rms to go to the capital market for future funds, thus reducing agency-costs (Zechhauser and Pund, 1990; Short et al., 2002) .
Studying ex-dividend price-behavior: the traditional approach
The ex-dividend price-change has traditionally been analyzed using the DOR as the dependent variable. Elton and Gruber (1970) showed in a classic paper that it was determined by the net-of-marginal-tax ratio between dividends and capital gains, i.e., DOR = ( The Elton and Gruber (1970) model suggests that the DOR should change when the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains for domestic individual investors changes. A number of studies (Booth and Johnston, 1984; Poterba and Summers, 1984; Barclay, 1987; Michaely, 1991; Robin, 1991; Athanassakos and Fowler, 1993; Skinner, 1993; de Ridder and Söder-sten, 1995; and Wu and Hsu, 1996) have used such regime shifts to investigate the behavior of shareholders in the period around the ex-dividend day.
These studies often regress
where the dependent variable is the DOR 3 for stock i in year t, P c it and P x it are the closing prices on the cum-and the ex-dividend days, respectively, D it is the dividend per share, 0 is a constant, and " it is the error-term.
Changes in the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains are indicated by I j , a dummy that is equal to one during a speci…c tax regime j.
Some of the earlier studies (e.g., Poterba and Summers, 1984; Barclay, 1987; Robin, 1991) found that taxes in ‡uenced ex-dividend price behavior, while others (e.g., Skinner, 1993; de Ridder and Södersten, 1995) found that they did not. Most found the DOR positively related to dividend yield, perhaps as a result of tax-induced clienteles as discussed earlier (Elton and Gruber, 1970) . Kalay (1982 Kalay ( , 1984 and Miller and Scholes (1982) argued that marginal tax rates cannot be derived from the DOR because institutional and individual investors often face di¤erent tax rules, e.g., institutional investors may be taxed equally on dividends and capital gains, while dividends are tax penalized for individuals (Boyd and Jagannathan, 1994) . Kalay (1982 Kalay ( , 1984 showed that institutional investors may be able to exploit such tax di¤erences to make arbitrage pro…ts and that such pro…t opportunities will be directly proportional to the dividend yield.
Hence, a positive relation between the DOR and dividend yield might occur either because of tax-induced clienteles or because of arbitrage trading by institutional investors. Previous ex-dividend price studies have not been 3 The use of the DOR as the dependent variable means that the sample must be restricted to …rms paying dividends; however, in every period some …rms choose not to pay dividends, which restricts the sample. able to empirically discriminate between these two hypotheses.
Studying ex-dividend price behavior: the new approach
The traditional approach focusing on the DOR has been critized because the error-term may be heteroskedastic (Lakonishak and Vermaelen, 1986; Barclay, 1987; and Michaely, 1991) . Boyd and Jagganathan (1994) instead used the percentage price change between the cum-and ex-dividend days as the dependent variable, as did Green and Rydqvist (1999), McDonald (2001) , Bell and Jenkinson (2002), and Florensen and Rydqvist (2002) .
In this approach one regresses
where the dependent variable is the percentage price change between the cum-and ex-dividend days for stock i in year t, D it is again the dividend; 0 is a constant; " it is the error-term; and I j is a dummy equal to one during a speci…c tax regime j, zero otherwise. 4
In addition to tax-induced clienteles and arbitrage trading, non-tax factors may in ‡uence ex-dividend day price changes. For example, Frank and Jagganathan (1998) showed that prices in the Hong Kong stock market dropped less than the dividend amount, due to microstructure e¤ects and transaction costs. Bali and Hite (1998) also provided some empirical evidence that the tick-e¤ect, i.e., that stock prices change discretely, also leads to a DOR less than one. The constant ( 0 ) was included in the model to control for such e¤ects.
The new approach produces two parameters: an intercept (the constant, 0 ) and a slope-coe¢ cient. Boyd and Jagganathan (1994) showed that the intercept will be negative (and statistically signi…cant) if non-tax factors are important for ex-dividend price behavior, while the slope-coe¢ cient estimates the DOR: Hence, this approach makes it possible to carry out more detailed hypothesis testing.
ation of ordinary income and capital income were separated, with capital gains and dividends taxed at 30%. In 1992 the capital gains tax-rate was reduced to 25%. It was further reduced in 1994, while the tax on dividends was removed entirely. Uniform 30% taxes were reinstated in 1995. Hence, there were four di¤erent periods and three di¤erent relationships between the tax-rates on capital gains and dividends during the study period (Table   1 , below). Compared to previous ex-dividend studies, these changes provide greater variation to study. De…nitions of all the variables included in the empirical analysis, as well as means and standard deviations, are given in Table 2 . The variables included are further discussed in Section 4.
Table 2 About Here
A majority of the …rms (225 of 302) paid dividends, the average yield beeing 2.1%. The average yield is thus larger than those in previous exdividend studies (e.g., Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986) , which is not surprising, since dividends are paid yearly in Sweden, rather than quarterly as in the US.
Empirical Models
We estimate equations for both the ex-dividend price-change and the dividend amount, and we will start with the latter.
Estimating the determinants of dividend payments
Previous studies usually restricted attention to …rms paying dividends. However, since dividends are censored at zero, valuable information may be lost by excluding non-paying …rms (Kim and Maddala, 1992) . In addition to the standard least squares regression model, we therefore use a censored normal regression model (Tobit model) to estimate the determinants of dividends.
Our main attention is focused on the e¤ects of dividend and capital gains taxation, but it is di¢ cult to estimate the e¤ects of each of two taxes separately, since the marginal tax rate on dividends remained the same, except for 1994. Unfortunately, the period under study also coincides with a major downturn of the Swedish economy, making it di¢ cult to separate changes in tax rates from changes in the business cycle. Therefore, in order to address the e¤ects of taxation and at the same time control for the business cycle, taxation is measured as the net-of-tax ratio (T AX RAT IO) between the dividend tax and the capital gains tax, de…ned as (1
hypothesis to be explored is that, other things equal, T AX RAT IO should have a positive e¤ect on dividends. To capture the business cycle, the regressions are conditioned on GDP per capita at …xed prices ( Table 2 above provides de…nitions of all variables).
In the Tobit model, D it is a latent variable describing the dividend per share for stock i in year t, with equation
where T AX RAT IO and GDP are de…ned as above; D it 1 is the dividend per share in the previous period; O-LIST is a dummy, equal to one if the …rm's shares are available on any list besides the so-called A-list on the SSE; F it is a vector of …rm-speci…c characteristics; and it is an error-term, assumed normally distributed with constant variance. The vector 0 and 0 4 are parameters to be estimated. Lintner (1956) argued that dividends are mainly determined by the dividend in the previous period, so we expect 1 to be positive. The O-LIST variable is assumed to capture the maturity of the …rm; those not on the A-list are expected to pay lower dividends.
The …rm-speci…c vector, F it , contains variables commonly used in the analysis of dividend pay-outs. M ARKET -T O-BOOK is the ratio of market value to book value, assumed to capture growth opportunities of the individual …rm. 5 According to the dividend-signaling hypothesis (discussed in Section 2), such growth …rms pay high dividends to inform investors about their growth prospects, so M ARKET -T O-BOOK should be positively related to dividends. On the other hand, Gaver and Gaver (1993) suggest that growth …rms might pay low dividends to exploit their high growth opportunities, so there is no clear-cut hypothesis about the sign of this coe¢ cient.
EARN IN GS is net per share; more pro…table …rms are assumed to pay higher dividends than less pro…table ones. CASHF LOW (from operation per share) is included to re ‡ect liquidity; we expect …rms with higher liquidity to pay higher dividends. LOG EM P LOY M EN T is the (log of the) number of employees expressing the size of the …rm; as agency-costs associated with managerial discretion are thought to increase with size, high dividends might be paid to reduce them. Therefore, we expect that dividends should be increasing in employment. BET A is a measure of the riskiness of the stock, expected to decrease the dividend. 6 Short et al. (2002) found that institutional ownership may in ‡uence a …rm's dividend policy. Unfortunately, we have no information on institutional ownership. However, the variable F OREIGN SHARE, indicating the share of stocks held by foreigners, is included since we believe most foreign owners to be institutional investors.
The censoring-rule for the Tobit regression can be written as
In the least squares model, only positive values of the dependent variable 6 The beta value for stock i in year t (bit) is estimated, using daily data from the year preceding the dividend pay-out, with
where Ris is the individual return on stock i on day s; ai is a constant; Rms is the market return on day s (approximated by A¤ärsvärlden's value weighted general index); and eis is the error-term.
are included, implying that D it = D it .
Estimating ex-dividend price behavior
Next we estimate price changes on the ex-dividend day, using both the traditional approach where the dependent variable is the price-drop-to-dividend ratio (DOR) and the new approach, comparing ex-dividend to the cumdividend prices.
As noted earlier, in the traditional approach the sample must be limited to …rms paying dividends. The estimating equation is
which is almost identical to equation (1), except that there are no dummies for tax regimes, because the ‡at tax-rates for domestic individual investors on dividends and capital gains, following the Swedish tax-reform in 1991, allow inclusion of direct measure of their di¤erential tax treatment (T AX RAT IO t ). Tax rate changes can thus be separated from other period speci…c developments, such as technological changes or the business cycle.
During the years when dividends and capital gains were taxed equally at a ‡at rate of 30% irrespective of total taxable income (i.e., 1991 and 1995), The 1991 Swedish tax reform provides a unique opportunity to examine the tax-clientele hypothesis using aggregate price data from the stock market. As discussed earlier, the documented positive relation between the DOR and dividend yield could be a consequence of either tax-induced clienteles or arbitrage trading by professional institutional investors, or both (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986) . Previous studies of ex-dividend price behavior have not been able to distinguish empirically between these two competing hypotheses. However, the tax-clientele hypothesis implicitly assumes that dividends and capital gains are taxed as ordinary income. When they are separated and taxed as investment income subject to a ‡at rate, as in Sweden after 1991, a positive relation between the DOR and dividend yield cannot be explained by tax-induced clienteles. Hence, if ex-dividend price changes, as suggested by Elton and Gruber (1970) , are solely driven by the di¤erential tax treatment of dividends and capital gains, then = 1 and 0 ; 1 = 0.
The estimating equation for the new approach is
where the dependent variable (EX-P RICE CHAN GE) is the percent price change between the cum-and ex-dividend days for stock i in year t; and I 91;95 , I 92 93 and I 94 are dummies for the tax regimes during the study period (Table 1, above) .
With the new approach we thus estimate the DORs directly, i.e., the parameters 1 , 2 , and 3 measure ex-dividend price changes relative to the dividend. Given the ‡at tax rates, there are two null hypotheses, depending upon who is the marginal shareholder: If domestic individual investors are driving the market, we would expect 1 = 1, 2 = 0:933, and
If institutional investors (facing identical tax-rates) are driving the market, the null hypothesis is H 0 : ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) = (1; 1; 1), which can be tested the same way. Table 3 presents estimation results from four models of equation (3) The parameter on DIV IDEN D Y IELD is signi…cant (at 10%) and positive, indicating higher DOR for higher dividend yield stocks. Since dividends and capital gains were taxed at ‡at rates independently of ordinary income, this cannot be explained by tax-induced clienteles. The parameter on the net-of-tax ratio (T AX RAT IO) is not signi…cant, though positive.
Results
In the new approach (the second column), the DORs are estimated directly, tracking di¤erential taxation over time fairly closely. For 1991 and 1995, the estimated DOR is 1.04 (corresponding T AX RAT IO is 1, from were driving market prices (F (3; 298) = 1:37 ; p-value = 0:25). However, the much higher p-value for individual investors favors that hypothesis. 8
Summary and Conclusions
Swedish stock market data from 1991-1995 was used to analyze the e¤ects of taxation on dividend payments and ex-dividend price changes. This data is especially suitable since dividends and capital gains were taxed at ‡at rates 8 A possible source of bias is if the ex-price change and dividends are a¤ected by the same unobserved factors. This would be the case if dividends are a¤ected by unobserved information and this information is revealed after the cum-dividend day. We have therefore estimated models where dividends are potentially endogenous in the EX-P RICE CHAN GE equation. However, the hypothesis of (weak) exogeneity could not be rejected.
separately from ordinary income. It was thus possible to test hypotheses regarding the role of private investors in much more detail than is usually the case. To our knowledge, this is the …rst attempt to study the determinants of dividends and ex-dividend day price changes jointly, which is important because the e¤ects of the taxation of dividends and capital gains on ex-dividend prices cannot be treated independently from its e¤ects on dividends themselves. In contrast to previous studies, we also incorporated zero-dividend stocks when analyzing the percentage change between cumand ex-dividend prices.
The results indicate that dividends were in ‡uenced by the taxation of dividends and capital gains. This e¤ect found is relatively large and robust to changes in speci…cation, meaning that …rms took account of tax rates when deciding the size of dividends. To get a sense of the magnitudes involved, assume dividends and capital gains are initially taxed at a ‡at rate of 30%, and that policymakers abolish the dividend tax, while leaving the capital gains tax rate una¤ected. The results here indicate that dividends would increase about 40%.
In accordance with most previous studies, we …nd the price-drop-todividend ratio positively related to dividend yields, which cannot be explained in this case by tax-induced clienteles among domestic individual investors because, as noted above, dividends and capital gains were taxed at ‡at rates, separately from ordinary income. This suggests that the observed positive relation was a result of arbitrage trading among professional institutional investors. We cannot reject the hypothesis that ex-day price changes were driven by domestic individual investors as the marginal shareholders, but neither can we reject the hypothesis that equally taxed institutional investors were the marginal shareholders. Finally, as suggested by Bali and Hite (1998) and Frank and Jagannathan (1998), non-tax factors seem to have in ‡uenced ex-dividend price changes. Variable de…nitions are given in Table 2 .
* denotes signi…cance at the ten-percent level.
** denotes signi…cance at the …ve-percent level.
*** denotes signi…cance at the one-percent level. 
